

Beyond the Ethnic-Civic Dichotomy: Cultural Citizenship as a New Way of Excluding Immigrants

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In European Union (EU) countries, public debates about immigrants and citizenship are increasingly framed in cultural terms. Yet, there is no agreement within the citizenship literature on whether a cultural citizenship representation can be distinguished from the more established ethnic and civic representations and on how its measures relate to anti-immigrant attitudes. The present study tested measures of citizenship representations among high school students (N = 1476) in six EU countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, and Sweden). Factor analyses favored a three-factor model of citizenship representations (i.e., ethnic, cultural, and civic factors), which showed partial metric invariance. Across countries, ethnic and cultural scales correlated positively with each other and negatively with the civic scale. Moreover, ethnic and cultural scales related positively and the civic scale negatively to anti-immigrant attitudes. However, when analyzed simultaneously, relations of the ethnic scale with anti-immigrant attitudes were no longer significant, while those of the cultural and civic scales proved to be robust. Implications of these findings are discussed.

KEY WORDS: ethnic citizenship representation, civic citizenship representation, cultural citizenship representation, multiculturalism, exclusion, outgroup attitudes

In the European Union (EU), the public debate about immigrants and, more specifically, about what is required from them to “earn” citizenship in their host country, is framed increasingly in terms of culture. Over the last 10 to 15 years, the idea of a multicultural society has come to be seriously questioned in many EU countries (see, for example, Vertovec & Wessendorf, 2010). One frequently heard criticism is that multicultural policies preserve cultural differences even when cultural practices of immigrants clash with the norms and values of national majority groups. In addition, the

accommodation of cultural differences would foster a separation between different ethnic and cultural groups in society, undermining a sense of national unity, because each group would live according to its own cultural norms and values. Multiculturalism is thus seen as a threat to national identity and social cohesion.

Concerns about protecting the national culture and about immigrants who do not adapt to that culture are clearly present in statements by politicians in several countries across the EU. German Chancellor Angela Merkel, for example, claimed that multiculturalism had failed. She said: “Of course the tendency had been to say, ‘let’s adopt the multicultural concept and live happily side by side, and be happy to be living with each other’. But this concept has failed, and failed utterly” (*The Guardian*, October 17, 2010). Bavarian state prime minister Horst Seehofer added that “multiculturalism is dead” and that both Merkel’s CDU and his CSU were committed to a “dominant German culture” (*The Guardian*, October 17, 2010). Belgian prime minister Yves Leterme said that “Merkel is right [about the failure of multiculturalism], in the sense that the integration policy has not always had the beneficial effects that were expected” and that immigrants “also have to adapt to the Belgian society” (*De Morgen*, November 2, 2010). In the Netherlands, Geert Wilders’ right-wing PVV, which offers crucial support to the current minority government, stated in its election program that “Our culture is under strong pressure. Islamization, cultural relativism, hate of the West, dislike of anything that hints of patriotism determines the way of thinking of our elites” (*Election Program PVV*, 2010).

These concerns about immigrants and the protection of national culture reflect ideas about how to represent citizenship. What criteria do immigrants need to fulfill in order to be regarded as citizens? Traditionally, the political science literature identified an ethnic and a civic conceptualization of citizenship (Brubaker, 1990; Kohn, 1944; Smith, 1991). More recently, a cultural conceptualization was also proposed (Kymlicka, 2001; Nielsen, 1999). It is still unclear whether, at the individual level, people actually manifest a cultural representation that corresponds to the theoretical conceptualization of cultural citizenship. Furthermore, in the citizenship literature as well as in the public debate, a cultural citizenship representation is portrayed as fair, liberal, and open towards immigrants (Kymlicka, 2001), but there is no empirical evidence to back up these claims. Because discussions about immigrants and citizenship are increasingly framed in cultural terms, it is important to examine whether people indeed manifest a cultural representation. The present study aims to fill this research gap by investigating whether a cultural citizenship representation can be distinguished, besides ethnic and civic representations, among majority group members in six EU countries (i.e., high school students in academic tracks in Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, and Sweden), and, if so, how measures of these three representations relate to each other and to attitudes towards immigrants.

Citizenship Representations From a Social Psychological Perspective

Within the political science literature, citizenship representations are often understood as deeply rooted and stable social and historical characteristics of nation-states that are mainly expressed through state policies and legislation (Kohn, 1944). In addition, some authors stress that citizenship representations constitute an important part of the content of national identity (Brubaker, 1996; Shulman, 2002). Brubaker assumes that at least a majority of citizens endorse their state’s citizenship representation and apply its reasoning in personal ideas about citizenship. Therefore, it is important to examine citizenship representations from a social psychological perspective (i.e., how individual members of the national majority group represent citizenship), instead of deducing citizenship representations solely from state policies.

When studying people’s views at the individual level, citizenship representations are understood from the social psychological perspective of social identity and self-categorization rather than as

characteristics of nation-states. Social identity theory (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 1986) states that social identities (i.e., identities derived from memberships of social groups) are an important part of a person's overall identity. According to self-categorization theory (SCT; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987), once a social group is formed, its members go through a process of self-stereotyping. They create an ingroup prototype, that is, a representation of what defines the group as a whole (i.e., in terms of norms, values, and customs) and what characteristics define its members. The prototypical characteristics that group members are desired to have may function as criteria of group membership and may be used to include or exclude potential new members. In addition, because it incorporates norms of appropriate intergroup behavior, the ingroup prototype is important in determining outgroup attitudes. In national groups, different views on what characterizes the national ingroup and the prototypical ingroup member may exist side by side (Brubaker, 2004; Hjerm, 1998; Kuzio, 2002), and citizenship representations are understood as subjective definitions of the national ingroup prototype. We were interested to find out whether national majority group members, at the individual level, would manifest citizenship representations that correspond to the theoretical conceptualizations of ethnic, civic, and cultural citizenship in the citizenship literature. Because citizenship criteria applied by majority group members are subjective, they do not necessarily reflect the official citizenship criteria applied at the state level (Rothì, Lyons, & Chryssochoou, 2005). Therefore, having been granted citizenship by the state does not guarantee acceptance as a fellow citizen by national majority group members.

Measures of Citizenship Representations and Their Interrelations

The distinction between ethnic and civic citizenship representations is widely used in the literature (Brubaker, 1990; Kohn, 1944; Smith, 1991). The ethnic citizenship representation was derived from the "ius sanguinis" principle of nation building (Brubaker, 1990), according to which citizenship is based on blood ties. When citizenship is represented in an ethnic way, the national ingroup is defined as a community of people of common descent and citizenship is determined on the basis of that descent (i.e., only those who have ancestors from the dominant ethnic group are regarded as citizens). In contrast, the civic citizenship representation was derived from the "ius soli" principle of nation building (Brubaker, 1990), according to which citizenship is based on living within the national territory. When citizenship is represented in a civic way, the national ingroup is defined as a community of people who adhere to a social contract, which contains a set of basic principles that facilitate life as a community (e.g., respect for societal rules and laws, endorsement of equal political rights, and active participation in society). Adherence to this contract, which is open to anyone who wishes to commit him/herself to it (irrespective of ethnic origin or cultural background), is a sufficient condition to be regarded as a citizen. Civic citizenship is seen as liberal, voluntaristic, universalistic, and inclusive of immigrants, whereas ethnic citizenship is often portrayed as illiberal, ascriptive, particularistic, and exclusionist with respect to immigrants (Brubaker, 2004; Kohn, 1944). So, in theory, measures of ethnic and civic citizenship representations should be negatively related. However, whereas some studies indeed found a negative relation (e.g., Meeus, Duriez, Vanbeselaere, & Boen, 2010), others have found a positive relation between ethnic and civic scales (e.g., Pehrson, Vignoles, & Brown, 2009; Reeskens & Hooghe, 2010).

Regarding a cultural citizenship representation, Kymlicka (2001) noted that certain national groups, like those in Quebec and Catalonia, which, in his view, represent citizenship predominantly on the basis of culture, were mislabeled as ethnic in the literature. According to him, citizenship represented on the basis of culture is qualitatively different from citizenship represented on the basis of either ethnic or civic principles (see also Nielsen, 1999). When citizenship is represented in a cultural way, the national ingroup is defined as a community of people who share a common culture. The community's main aim is to ensure the survival of its culture, which is considered to be "open

to all” (i.e., anyone who adopts the national culture, cherishes it, and helps to preserve it may be regarded as a citizen). According to Kymlicka, this implies that when people endorse a cultural representation they are, in principle, open towards immigrants who wish to become citizens. So, in theory, measures of a cultural citizenship representation should be positively related to measures of a civic representation and negatively to measures of an ethnic representation. To our knowledge, only one study examined the relations between measures of ethnic, civic, and cultural citizenship representations. It found that measures of all three representations were positively related (Pehrson, Vignoles et al., 2009).

Is the Cultural Representation Distinct From Ethnic and Civic Representations?

Whether a distinct cultural representation of citizenship is manifested at the individual level, by members of national majority groups, remains a contested issue. Traditionally, studies have only considered ethnic and civic representations. However, measures of ethnic and civic citizenship representations often included items that could be interpreted as cultural. For example, a cultural item about “adherence to the dominant religion” would be included in an ethnic scale and one about “speaking the national language” in a civic scale. So far, studies that explicitly investigated the possibility of a cultural citizenship representation found no statistical evidence to suggest that their participants manifested a distinct cultural representation next to the ethnic and civic representations. For example, using exploratory factor analysis, Reeskens and Hooghe (2010) found only a two-factor structure in their measure of citizenship representations (i.e., an ethnic and a civic factor, both of which included a cultural element). In other words, the cultural items did not form a reliable separate scale that measured a distinct cultural representation, but could instead be incorporated in the ethnic and civic scales. A complicating factor is that there is no evidence that measures of citizenship representations are cross-nationally equivalent, so different items may represent different citizenship representations across countries. Due to the inconsistent factor structure across countries, Pehrson, Vignoles et al. (2009) did not create measurement scales, but opted for single-item measures of citizenship representations without testing whether a cultural representation could be treated as distinct from ethnic and civic representations (i.e., “having ancestors,” “having citizenship,” and “speaking the language” as ethnic, civic, and cultural citizenship criteria, respectively). The same holds true for Shulman (2002), who made an a priori classification of citizenship items as either civic or cultural. Nevertheless, because the public debate about citizenship is increasingly framed in cultural terms, it seems worthwhile to reconsider the issue of a cultural citizenship representation. We believe that the difficulties with distinguishing a cultural representation, the lack of cross-national equivalence of citizenship representation measures, and also the mixed findings regarding the relations between these measures are all related to specific measurement issues, which seem to arise due to a lack of conceptual clarity. In this study we aim to address these issues (cf. *infra* “The Present Study” and “Methods”).

Inclusiveness of Citizenship Criteria and Attitudes Towards Immigrants

One of our aims was to study how measures of citizenship representations relate to attitudes towards immigrants. To that end, it is relevant to look at the level of inclusiveness of the citizenship criteria that are linked to the three representations. Although all citizenship criteria are inwardly inclusive and outwardly exclusive (no matter how flexible they are), there are large differences in the inclusiveness of ethnic, civic, and cultural citizenship criteria. For most immigrants it is impossible to fulfill ethnic citizenship criteria, because they can never change their ethnicity or ancestry. Even a White person from Britain, who migrates to Belgium, can never change the fact that his/her ancestors were British and not Belgian. In essence, ethnic criteria are fixed characteristics, which

give them an inherently essentialist and exclusionist nature. In accordance with this, measures of an ethnic citizenship representation were consistently found to be associated with negative attitudes and affect towards immigrants (Pehrson, Brown, & Zagefka, 2009; Vanbeselaere, Boen, & Meeus, 2006), ethnic prejudice (Meeus et al., 2010; Pehrson, Vignoles et al., 2009), and xenophobia (Hjerm, 1998). In sharp contrast, it is relatively easy for immigrants to fulfill civic citizenship criteria. All that is required is that they respect the basic civic principles that hold a society together. Furthermore, a civic citizenship representation stresses equal rights and encourages participation in society. In line with this, measures of a civic representation were found to be associated with positive attitudes and affect towards immigrants (Vanbeselaere et al., 2006) and lower levels of ethnic prejudice (Meeus et al., 2010). However, Pehrson, Vignoles et al. (2009) found a positive relation with ethnic prejudice, and Hjerm (1998) found that, although endorsement of civic citizenship criteria was associated with a reduced chance of being xenophobic, strong endorsement of both civic *and* ethnic citizenship criteria was associated with a higher chance of being xenophobic.

Regarding cultural citizenship criteria, Kymlicka (2001) theorizes that people with a cultural representation welcome immigrants, because national culture is seen as open to all who are willing to commit themselves to it. However, we wonder to what extent culture can really be seen that way. Although it is possible for immigrants to fulfill cultural citizenship criteria, this is done at a high price. To be regarded as citizens, they are required to adopt the host culture and abandon their own (Shulman, 2002). If social identities are an important part of a person's overall identity and a source of self-respect and self-esteem, as suggested by SIT (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), then it seems harsh and rather demeaning to expect immigrants to abandon their own culture. In line with this, most immigrants appear unwilling to accept a process of assimilation in order to be regarded as citizens (Judd, Park, Ryan, Brauer, & Kraus, 1995; Rohmann, Florack, & Piontkowski, 2006; Snauwaert, Soenens, Vanbeselaere, & Boen, 2003; Verkuyten & Thijs, 2002).

Although "viewing national culture as open to all" and "welcoming immigrants who are willing to assimilate as fellow citizens" may be part of the theoretical conceptualization of cultural citizenship, we believe that people who endorse a cultural citizenship representation do not reason this way. Instead, we argue that they use a cultural representation to exclude immigrants as culturally different or deviant. A cultural citizenship representation implies a preference for a culturally homogeneous nation. Majority group members who consider the preservation of their national culture to be important tend to view immigrants negatively, because they perceive them to be a threat to this culture (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007). From their perspective, immigrants are not welcome (i.e., whether they are willing to assimilate or not), but when they do enter the country they should indeed assimilate (to protect cultural homogeneity). In line with these arguments, we suspect that measures of a cultural citizenship representation will be associated with negative attitudes towards immigrants.

Another theoretical reason to suspect an association with negative attitudes towards immigrants has to do with a historical shift in the sociopolitical climate that has taken place as a result of the horrors of World War II. This shift has made it socially unacceptable to express negative outgroup attitudes based on race and ethnicity. The social psychology literature describes it as a shift from blatant to more subtle or symbolic forms of racism (Dovidio, 2000; Kleinpenning & Hagendoorn, 1993; Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995). Instead of focusing on race, the main theme of symbolic racism is the protection of ingroup culture (Kleinpenning & Hagendoorn, 1993), which also happens to be the main theme of a cultural citizenship representation. The main goal of symbolic racism is to maintain cultural dominance and the national culture has to be accepted by immigrants, which is also in line with a cultural citizenship representation. Because of these similarities in main theme and goal, there is reason to assume a close link between a cultural citizenship representation and symbolic racism. If there is, then measures of a cultural citizenship representation can be expected to relate to negative attitudes towards immigrants, contrary to Kymlicka's claim that cultural citizenship implies openness to immigrants.

If the shift from blatant to symbolic racism affects the way in which citizenship is represented, a further implication may be that the relationship between measures of a cultural citizenship representation and attitudes towards immigrants is now more robust than the relationship between measures of an ethnic representation and attitudes towards immigrants. After all, a cultural representation is in line with the more symbolic forms of contemporary racism, while an ethnic representation is in line with blatant racism, which has become socially unacceptable. As an indication of an increased importance of a cultural over an ethnic citizenship representation, research in 21 European countries showed that in each country culture was a much more important symbolic boundary between national majority group members and immigrants than race (Bail, 2008). The observation that the public debate about citizenship is increasingly framed in cultural terms is also in line with this finding.

The Present Study

Although the domain of citizenship research has brought forth cross-nationally valid measures for a wide range of attitudinal dimensions, measures of the ethnic, civic, and cultural citizenship representations, that exhibit construct validity across countries and that meet the requisites of cross-national measurement equivalence, are still lacking. Without cross-national equivalence, it is not possible to determine whether different results across countries are caused by genuine country differences or by measurement differences. It also becomes difficult to determine which items measure what type of citizenship representation, because, without cross-national equivalence, items may measure different representations in different countries, which makes cross-national comparisons very difficult (Meuleman & Billiet, 2006). Indeed, there is no consensus on which citizenship criteria reflect what type of citizenship representation (Brubaker, 2004). The effects of low-construct validity can best be explained with an example: The civic item “To be a citizen, it is important to participate in society” does not reflect the civic idea that adhering to such basic principles is sufficient to be regarded a citizen. As a consequence, someone with an ethnic representation is just as likely to endorse the item as someone with a civic representation, which obviously influences how scales for different citizenship representations are interrelated and how they relate to attitudes towards immigrants.

In this study, conducted in six EU countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, and Sweden), we attempted to develop cross-nationally equivalent measures of citizenship representations with high-construct validity, by building upon existing items (see method section). With these measures, we wished to answer the following four questions:

- 1) What is the factor structure of the measure of citizenship representations and is it cross-nationally equivalent?
- 2) How do measures of different citizenship representations relate to each other?
- 3) How do measures of different citizenship representations relate to attitudes towards immigrants, and are these relations cross-nationally equivalent?
- 4) Does a measure of a cultural citizenship representation have more robust relations with attitudes towards immigrants than a measure of an ethnic citizenship representation does?

The first question to be answered is how many factors, accounting for significant amounts of common variance, can be extracted from the items that constitute our citizenship representations measure and how these factors should be labeled. We need to establish whether ethnic, civic, and cultural measurement scales can be distinguished and whether these scales exhibit cross-national measurement equivalence (Meuleman & Billiet, 2006). Given that the literature provides no unequivocal answer concerning the number of citizenship representations, we will explore which

factor structure best describes our data. Although we formulate no explicit hypothesis, this first step is, of course, a prerequisite for answering the remaining three questions.

Based upon their theoretical conceptualization, civic citizenship can be seen as liberal, voluntaristic, universalistic, and inclusive and ethnic citizenship as illiberal, ascriptive, particularistic, and exclusionist. Therefore, regarding question 2, we predict a negative relation between measures of ethnic and civic citizenship representations (Hypothesis 1a). In contrast to Kymlicka's (2001) conceptualization of cultural citizenship, we considered viewing culture as "open to all" to be problematic and argued that when people endorse a cultural representation they do not welcome immigrants. We believe a cultural representation is more similar to an ethnic than to a civic representation in that regard. Therefore, we predict that a measure of a cultural citizenship representation relates positively to a measure of an ethnic and negatively to a measure of a civic citizenship representation (Hypotheses 1b and 1c).

To answer question 3, we examined how measures of citizenship representations relate to attitudes towards multiculturalism and towards the exclusion of immigrants. Multiculturalism was chosen because it holds that cultural groups differ in positive ways and that these differences should be acknowledged and valued because they enrich society (Berry & Kalin, 1995) and these ideas are central to the current political debate in several EU countries. They contrast sharply with ethnic and cultural citizenship representations in which cultural differences are not valued. Therefore, we expect negative relations between a measure of multiculturalism attitudes and measures of both ethnic and cultural citizenship representations (Hypotheses 2a and 2b). In contrast, from the perspective of a civic representation, cultural differences are acceptable, equal rights for minorities are advocated, and their participation in society is encouraged. Hence, we expect a positive relation between measures of a civic representation and multiculturalism attitudes (Hypothesis 2c). In addition, attitudes towards exclusion were chosen, because ethnic, civic, and cultural citizenship criteria clearly differ with respect to the inclusion of immigrants. From the perspective of those who endorse an ethnic representation, only people who descend from the dominant ethnic group can be citizens. We also argued that when people endorse a cultural representation they do not welcome immigrants, because they are perceived as a threat to the national majority group culture. For these reasons, we expected that measures of ethnic and cultural citizenship representations would relate positively to a tendency to exclude immigrants (Hypothesis 2d and 2e). In contrast, because a civic citizenship representation stresses minority equality and participation, we expected a negative relation between measures of a civic representation and exclusion attitudes (Hypothesis 2f).

With respect to question 4, we have argued that the historical shift from blatant to symbolic racism may affect the way in which citizenship is represented. If it does, then nowadays we can expect the relationship between measures of a cultural citizenship representation and attitudes towards immigrants to be more robust than the relationship between measures of an ethnic representation and attitudes towards immigrants (Hypothesis 3). This is because a cultural citizenship representation is in line with today's symbolic forms of racism, while an ethnic representation is in line with blatant racism, which has become socially unacceptable. As a consequence of the historical shift from blatant to symbolic racism, we argue that a cultural representation of citizenship may have become more relevant in explaining attitudes towards immigrants than an ethnic representation.

Method

Participants and Procedure

Six countries were selected that were geographically dispersed across the EU (i.e., Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, and Sweden). These countries have different citizenship policies, and they vary with respect to public attitudes towards immigrants. In Belgium, we only

Table 1. Statistics on Majority Group Participants by Country

Country	<i>N</i>	Male	<i>M</i> _{Age}	<i>SD</i> _{Age}
Belgium (Flanders)	236	44.1%	17.38	0.67
France	186	39.8%	17.74	1.30
Germany	207	47.8%	17.61	0.94
Hungary	272	36.8%	16.87	1.24
The Netherlands	305	46.9%	16.58	0.83
Sweden	270	38.1%	17.18	0.63

gathered data in Flanders (i.e., the Dutch-speaking part of the country). During 2009, we conducted a comparative cross-national survey among high school students, studying at a level preparing them for university. This level mainly contains middle-class majority group students. To further facilitate the comparability of our samples, participating high schools were located in medium- to large-sized cities with substantial immigrant populations. A total of 1,476 students participated in the study across the six countries (see Table 1 for information about participants by country). As can be seen in Table 1, the samples were quite similar with respect to average age and percentages of male and female participants. In addition, parental education (i.e., a proxy for socioeconomic status) was also comparable across countries. On average parents received vocational or higher vocational training.

In order to conduct the cross-national survey study we compiled our own questionnaire, starting from several measures which had been used in earlier studies. Initially we had an English version of the questionnaire which was sent to researchers we had contacted at universities in each country. They made a version of the questionnaire in their national language, following a meticulous process of translation, back translation, and detailed comparison and discussion (in which we were often involved) to arrive at a final product (see also Van de Vijver & Leung, 1997). In order to limit the length of the questionnaire, we chose to ask participants about their attitudes towards one specific immigrant group, namely the most devalued non-EU immigrant group in their country. We assumed that the relations between our variables would be most pronounced when focusing on these particular groups. Our research partners in each country decided on which immigrant group would be considered (see Table 3), and they organized the data collection in the participating high schools. They made sure that the participation of individual students was on a voluntary basis so that students had the right to withdraw from the research at any point. The questionnaires were filled out in the classroom with at least one researcher present (in most cases the first author and a local researcher).

Measures

Citizenship Representations

All citizenship items are presented in the Appendix. They were based on measures adopted from Vanbeselaere (2007) and Meeus et al. (2010). Ethnic items inquired about essentialist criteria of citizenship (e.g., ancestry), cultural items stressed the criteria of cherishing and protecting the dominant national culture, and civic items stressed respect for rules and laws, active participation, equal political rights, and the irrelevance of origin and culture. We attempted to improve the existing items in several ways. First, their clarity was improved by using easier words and/or a different ordering of words. For example, cultural item #6 (see Appendix) was changed from “you exert yourself to maintain and further develop Belgian culture” to “a Belgian person dedicates him/herself to further developing the Belgian culture and to preserve it.” Second, items were adjusted to make them more exclusively represent one type of citizenship (i.e., to improve construct validity). For example, some civic items now stress the irrelevance of origin and/or culture, which is in line with civic but not with ethnic or cultural citizenship representations, or put emphasis on the idea that

adhering to basic civic principles is a sufficient condition to be regarded a citizen. Third, given that some items focused on what newcomers have to do (e.g., cultural item #2), while others focused on what people who are already part of the national ingroup have to do (e.g., civic item #2), we gave these groups of items different introductions to enhance this distinction (see Appendix). All items were measured on 7-point Likert scales (either 1 = *very unimportant*, 4 = *neither unimportant nor important*, 7 = *very important* or 1 = *strongly disagree*, 4 = *neither disagree nor agree*, 7 = *strongly agree*). Higher scores meant stronger endorsement of the respective citizenship representations.

Attitudes Towards Immigrants

Items were measured on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = *strongly disagree*, 4 = *neither disagree nor agree*, 7 = *strongly agree*). Multiculturalism attitudes were measured with eight items that were based on Berry and Kalin's (1995) scale. For example, "Personally I think that a society, consisting of multiple cultural groups, is better equipped to deal with new problems" and "Personally I think that immigrants in (e.g., Belgium) should encourage their children to maintain the culture and traditions of their country of origin, because these enrich our society." Higher scores meant stronger endorsement of multiculturalism. Exclusion attitudes were measured with three items that were adopted from Cuddy, Fiske, and Glick (2007) and Mackie, Devos, and Smith (2000). They inquired about the exclusion of members of the most devalued non-EU immigrant group in a country (see Table 3). The three items were: "When I think of (e.g., Turks), I feel a tendency to . . ." (1) "exclude them," (2) "Avoid them," and (3) "Keep them at a distance." Higher scores meant a stronger tendency to exclude immigrants.

Analysis

To explore the factor structure of our citizenship representations measure, we first performed an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) on pooled data across the six countries. We were interested in the number of factors that accounted for significant amounts of common variance (i.e., as indicated by Eigenvalues > 1) and whether the content of these factors corresponded to the theoretical conceptualizations of citizenship we found in the literature. Because we assumed that citizenship representation factors would be separate but related constructs, we applied an oblique rotation (Geomin), which allows factor axes to be correlated (Yates, 1987). Second, we had to examine whether the factor structure obtained with EFA fitted the data of each individual national sample. In other words, we had to determine whether it exhibited cross-national measurement equivalence (Meuleman & Billiet, 2006). To that end, we conducted multiple group confirmatory factor analysis (MGCFAs). To assess measurement equivalence, a metrically invariant model (i.e., invariant factor loadings across countries) was compared to an unconstrained model with help of the differential Comparative Fit Index (ΔCFI ; Cheung & Rensvold, 2002). Because of our large sample size ($N = 1476$), we used the ΔCFI as an informal criterion for model comparison rather than the $\Delta\chi^2$ test, because the latter has been criticized for its strong sensitivity to sample size. Provided that the model fit of the constrained model is still acceptable, the null hypothesis of equivalence is accepted when $\Delta\text{CFI} \leq .01$. In a similar way, we assessed the metric invariance of our total measurement model (i.e., including multiculturalism and exclusion attitude measures). Third, we analyzed the latent interfactor correlations from the total measurement model to see how citizenship-representation scales related to each other and to attitudes towards immigrants. Fourth, we tested a multiple group structural equation model (MGSEM), in which citizenship-representation scales were used as simultaneous predictors of multiculturalism and exclusion attitudes. We tested this model to examine the combined effects of citizenship-representation scales on attitudes towards immigrants (i.e., the effects of each scale when the effects of other scales were controlled for). It enabled us to investigate which citizenship-representation scales had the most robust relations with attitudes towards immigrants. By setting the structural relations

between the citizenship-representation scales and attitude measures equal across countries, the model also allowed us to examine whether these relations were cross-nationally equivalent. All models were fitted with Mplus 6 (Muthén & Muthén, 2010) using maximum likelihood estimation and assuming multivariate normality. All analyses were based on continuous data, and MGCFA and MGSEM models only included continuous latent variables. Model fit was considered good when CFI \geq .90, the Root-Mean-Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) \leq .06, and the Standardized Root-Mean-Square Residual (SRMR) \leq .08 (Hu & Bentler, 1999; Marsh, Hau, & Wen, 2004).

Results

Exploratory Factor Analysis

EFA revealed a clear three-factor solution for the citizenship representation measure. Three factors had an Eigenvalue > 1.00 , and a three-factor model also had a good fit [$\chi^2(75, 1476) = 235.590, p < .001, CFI = .979, RMSEA = .038, SRMR = .020$]. Factor loadings of the citizenship representation items are presented in Table 2. An inspection of the pattern of loadings and of the content of the items made it apparent that ethnic, cultural, and civic items loaded on separate factors. Accordingly, we labeled the factors as ethnic, cultural, and civic citizenship representations, respectively. Two items did not load high enough (i.e., $\geq .40$) on any factor and were discarded in further analyses (see Table 2 and Appendix). The factor correlations were in accordance with our predictions. The ethnic and cultural factors correlated positively with each other ($r = .50, p < .001$; see Hypothesis 1b), and both correlated negatively with the civic factor ($r = -.56$ and $-.26, ps < .001$, respectively; see Hypotheses 1a and 1c).

Since prior research revealed that cultural items sometimes belong to either ethnic or civic scales, a two-factor model was tested to see whether, in such a model, the cultural items would be distributed over an ethnic and a civic factor. Although a two-factor solution did not have a good fit [$\chi^2(89, 1476) = 1029.389, p < .001, CFI = .880, RMSEA = .085, SRMR = .047$], it is interesting to note that the ethnic and civic items loaded in opposite directions on one factor while the cultural items loaded separately on a second factor. In sum, these EFA results demonstrate that our participants manifest a distinct cultural representation, besides ethnic and civic representations.

Table 2. Factor Loadings in a Cross-Country Exploratory Factor Analysis of Citizenship Representation Measures

Item	Ethnic	Cultural	Civic
Has [country] ancestors	0.699	0.021	-0.158
Was born in [country]	0.915	-0.086	0.008
Grew up in [country] family from an early age	0.859	-0.005	-0.009
Cherishes traditional [country] lifestyle	0.109	0.560	-0.079
Respects Christian origin of [country] culture	0.008	0.472	0.024
Respects [country] symbols	0.017	0.620	-0.045
Helps to protect [country] culture (rapid changes)	-0.069	0.692	-0.012
Passes on [country] culture (next generations)	-0.033	0.757	0.046
Dedicated to developing/preserving [country] culture	0.021	0.684	0.135
“Being [country]” nothing to do with origin/cultural background	-0.149	0.183	0.468
Accepts political participation of members of all cultural groups	0.072	0.010	0.684
Someone who legally settles receives same rights as citizen	-0.021	0.051	0.655
Origin/cultural background no reason to deny citizenship	0.038	-0.045	0.698
Citizenship for anyone who adheres to legal rules/participates	-0.019	-0.015	0.579
Irrespective of mother tongue, commands [country] language	-0.003	0.215	0.157
Citizenship only belongs to those who are [country] by origin	0.300	0.160	-0.363

Note. Items are abbreviated. Full items are given in the same order in the Appendix.

Confirmatory Factor Analysis

Citizenship Representations

A three-factor model of citizenship representations with invariant loadings of all indicators across countries (i.e., full metric invariance) had a slightly worse fit than the unconstrained model [$\chi^2(499, 1476) = 1006.745, p < .001, CFI = .927, RMSEA = .064, SRMR = .085, \Delta CFI = .014$]. A test of partial metric invariance (Steenkamp & Baumgartner, 1998) yielded a model in which four loadings (i.e., for cultural items #3 and #5 and civic item #1 in Hungary and cultural item #5 in Sweden; see Appendix) had to be released in order to achieve a good fit [$\chi^2(495, 1476) = 934.049, p < .001, CFI = .937, RMSEA = .060, SRMR = .075$]. This fit was not worse than the fit of the unconstrained model ($\Delta CFI = .004$). At this level of measurement equivalence, mean-corrected scores and, for example, correlations between latent variables (which are based on mean-corrected scores) can be compared across countries (Meuleman & Billiet, 2006). In sum, our results supported the cross-national equivalence of a distinct cultural citizenship representation, in addition to ethnic and civic representations, manifested among our participants.

Total Measurement Model

Apart from the measures of citizenship representations and multiculturalism and exclusion attitudes, the total measurement model included a latent variable which controlled for acquiescence effects on the multiculturalism attitude scale resulting from the inclusion of reverse coded items (Billiet & Davidov, 2008; Billiet & McClendon, 2000). A partially metrically invariant model, in which the same four loadings were released as in the three-factor citizenship representations model, had a good fit [$\chi^2(1656, 1476) = 2746.464, p < .001, CFI = .930, RMSEA = .052, SRMR = .073$], which was not worse than that of the unconstrained model ($\Delta CFI = .006$).

Means and Correlations

Means, standard deviations, and latent interfactor correlations are presented by country in Table 3. Participants in all countries scored lowest on the ethnic and highest on the civic scale, except in Hungary, where the highest mean was on the cultural scale. Hungary's mean on the ethnic scale did not significantly deviate from the midpoint of the 7-point Likert scale (labeled *neither unimportant nor important*), but all other country means deviated significantly from the midpoint and were situated on the "unimportant side" of the Likert scale (i.e., on average participants viewed ethnic citizenship criteria as unimportant to be regarded as a citizen). In contrast, on the cultural and civic scales, all country means deviated significantly from the midpoint and were situated at the "important side" of the Likert scale (i.e., on average participants thought cultural and civic citizenship criteria were important to be regarded as a citizen). In all countries, participants scored higher on the measure of multiculturalism attitudes than on that of exclusion attitudes. For multiculturalism, all country means deviated significantly from the midpoint towards the "agree side" of the Likert scale, except in Hungary, where it deviated significantly towards the "disagree side" (i.e., in all countries except Hungary participants, on average, agreed with the principles of multiculturalism). Finally, all country means for exclusion attitudes deviated significantly from the midpoint towards the "disagree side" of the Likert scale (i.e., on average participants did not feel a tendency to exclude members of the most devalued non-EU immigrant group).

An investigation of variance inflation factors (VIFs) revealed no multicollinearity in our data. VIFs should remain < 10 (Myers, 1990), and the largest VIF in our data was only 2.08. Overall, the latent interfactor correlations between the citizenship-representation scales were as expected (see Table 3). In all countries, the ethnic scale was negatively related to the civic (Hypothesis 1a) and positively to the cultural scale (Hypothesis 1b). The cultural scale also related negatively to the civic

Table 3. Means, Standard Deviations, and Latent Interfactor Correlations by Country

Belgium (Flanders):	M	SD	1.	2.	3.	4.
1. Ethnic representation	3.06 _{c1}	1.50	–			
2. Cultural representation	4.54 _{a4}	0.88	.33***	–		
3. Civic representation	4.83 _{b5}	0.93	–.56***	.11	–	
4. Multiculturalism	4.16 _{b3}	0.83	–.35***	–.36***	.48***	–
5. Exclusion (Moroccans)	3.74 _{d2}	1.37	.37***	.15	–.52***	–.59***
France:	M	SD	1.	2.	3.	4.
1. Ethnic representation	2.39 _{a1}	1.36	–			
2. Cultural representation	4.63 _{a2}	1.02	.36***	–		
3. Civic representation	5.50 _{de4}	0.90	–.46***	.14	–	
4. Multiculturalism	5.04 _{d3}	0.97	–.40***	–.40***	.51***	–
5. Exclusion (Moroccans)	2.25 _{a1}	1.17	.34***	.31***	–.28**	–.67***
Germany:	M	SD	1.	2.	3.	4.
1. Ethnic representation	2.39 _{a1}	1.33	–			
2. Cultural representation	4.45 _{a3}	1.07	.40***	–		
3. Civic representation	5.51 _{e4}	1.01	–.60***	–.29***	–	
4. Multiculturalism	4.53 _{c3}	1.06	–.53***	–.51***	.71***	–
5. Exclusion (Turks)	3.00 _{b2}	1.49	.45***	.37***	–.60***	–.65***
Hungary:	M	SD	1.	2.	3.	4.
1. Ethnic representation	3.84 _{d2}	1.58	–			
2. Cultural representation	5.23 _{b4}	1.07	.34***	–		
3. Civic representation	4.55 _{a3}	1.02	–.29***	–.11	–	
4. Multiculturalism	3.83 _{a2}	1.25	–.30***	–.11	.59***	–
5. Exclusion (Chinese)	3.12 _{bc1}	1.61	.27***	.14	–.45***	–.38***
The Netherlands:	M	SD	1.	2.	3.	4.
1. Ethnic representation	2.61 _{ab1}	1.44	–			
2. Cultural representation	4.50 _{a4}	1.00	.53***	–		
3. Civic representation	5.20 _{c5}	0.94	–.61***	–.30***	–	
4. Multiculturalism	4.17 _{b3}	1.02	–.50***	–.63***	.66***	–
5. Exclusion (Moroccans)	3.29 _{c2}	1.42	.48***	.38***	–.54***	–.53***
Sweden:	M	SD	1.	2.	3.	4.
1. Ethnic representation	2.69 _{b1}	1.80	–			
2. Cultural representation	4.55 _{a3}	1.27	.50***	–		
3. Civic representation	5.30 _{cd4}	1.18	–.57***	–.21**	–	
4. Multiculturalism	4.61 _{c3}	1.21	–.54***	–.42***	.75***	–
5. Exclusion (Iraqis)	2.97 _{b2}	1.72	.57***	.44***	–.51***	–.74***

Note. Letters following means indicate whether mean differences between countries (on the same variable) are significant. Means with no letters in common differ significantly from each other (lowest mean score starts with letter a, etc.).

Numbers following means indicate whether mean differences within one country (between the different variables) are significant. Means with no number in common differ significantly from each other (lowest mean score starts with number 1, etc.). Country's most devalued non-EU immigrant group mentioned following the exclusion variable.

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

scale (Hypothesis 1c), but in Belgium, France, and Hungary the relation was not significant. Overall, correlations with the multiculturalism and exclusion attitude measures, which were negatively correlated in all countries, were as expected. The ethnic and cultural representation scales related negatively and the civic scale positively to the multiculturalism attitude measure (Hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 2c), except in Hungary, where the cultural scale was unrelated to the measure of multiculturalism attitudes. The ethnic and cultural scales related positively, and the civic scale negatively to the

exclusion attitude measure (Hypotheses 2d, 2e, and 2f), except in Belgium and Hungary, where the cultural scale was unrelated to the measure of exclusion attitudes. In opposition to Kymlicka’s (2001) claim that support for cultural citizenship implies openness to immigrants, but in line with our predictions, the cultural citizenship-representation scale was associated with anti-immigrant attitudes.

Structural Equation Modeling

To study the combined effects of the three citizenship-representation scales, we tested a MGSEM model in which the ethnic, cultural, and civic scales were used as simultaneous predictors of measures of multiculturalism and exclusion attitudes. Metric invariance was imposed on the measurement part of the model, but loadings that were released in the total measurement model were freely estimated. In addition, to examine whether the structural relations of the citizenship-representation scales with the multiculturalism and exclusion attitude measures were invariant, we set these relations equal across countries. The model fitted the data well [$\chi^2(1692, 1476) = 2841.704, p < .001, CFI = .926, RMSEA = .053, SRMR = .078$] and not worse than the unconstrained model ($\Delta CFI = .008$). Looking at the strength of the relations in the model, we immediately noticed that the ethnic scale was not significantly related to the multiculturalism attitude measure and only weakly positively related to the measure of exclusion attitudes. Therefore, we tested whether we could set these relations equal to zero across countries in a modified, more parsimonious, model (based on the assumption that fluctuations around zero are due to unreliability rather than substantive covariation). This final model (see Figure 1) also had a good fit [$\chi^2(1694, 1476) = 2859.557, p < .001, CFI = .925, RMSEA = .053, SRMR = .079$], which was not worse than the fit of the unconstrained model ($\Delta CFI = .009$). This means that, when the




Figure 1. Multiple group structural equation model in which ethnic, cultural, and civic citizenship representation scales predict multiculturalism and exclusion attitudes, with invariant factor loadings and structural relations between predictors and dependent variables. Structural paths from the ethnic scale to multiculturalism and exclusion attitudes are set equal to zero across countries. Path-coefficients are unstandardized estimates. Correlations between latent variables are standardized (ranges are given on curved double-headed arrows). R^2 = Explained variance. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

cultural and civic scales were controlled for, the ethnic scale played no significant role in explaining attitudes towards immigrants. In line with our hypotheses, the cultural citizenship-representation scale related negatively to the multiculturalism and positively to the exclusion attitude measure (Hypotheses 2b and 2e), while for the civic scale, this pattern of relations was reversed (Hypotheses 2c and 2f). Finally, a model in which the relations of the cultural scale with the attitude measures were set equal to zero instead had a worse fit than the unconstrained model ($\Delta\text{CFI} = .016$). That these relations could not be set equal to zero shows that the cultural scale had more robust associations with attitudes towards immigrants than the ethnic scale (Hypothesis 3).

Discussion

In this study we wanted to examine what the factor structure of our citizenship representations measure would look like and whether this factor structure would be cross-nationally equivalent. We also wanted to see how measures of citizenship representations would relate to each other, how they would relate to attitudes towards immigrants and whether these relations would be cross-nationally equivalent, and, finally, whether a measure of a cultural citizenship representation would have more robust relations with attitudes towards immigrants compared to a measure of an ethnic representation. To answer these questions, we modified measures of citizenship representations and tested them on samples of high school students in academic tracks (average ages around 17) in Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, and Sweden. The results of factor analyses revealed that our participants manifested distinct ethnic, cultural, and civic citizenship representations. The analyses also led to the conclusion that this three-factor model of citizenship representations (i.e., ethnic, cultural, and civic factors) was partially metrically invariant, thus enabling cross-national comparisons of mean-corrected scores (Meuleman & Billiet, 2006). Overall, the ethnic and cultural citizenship-representation scales were positively related to each other and negatively to the civic representation scale. The ethnic and cultural scales were negatively related to a measure of multiculturalism attitudes and positively to an exclusion attitude measure, while for the civic representation scale this pattern was reversed. A structural equation model in which the ethnic, cultural, and civic scales were used as simultaneous predictors of the multiculturalism and exclusion attitude measures and in which the structural relations of the citizenship-representation scales with the multiculturalism and exclusion attitude measures were made invariant across countries fitted the data well, suggesting that the representation scales had similar relations with attitudes towards immigrants across countries. In addition, the relations of the ethnic scale with the multiculturalism and exclusion attitude measures could be set equal to zero across countries, which means that the ethnic scale played no significant role in explaining attitudes towards immigrants when the cultural and civic representation scales were controlled for. Even though countries had different most-devalued non-EU immigrant groups and their respective high school participants exhibited different views regarding citizenship and different ways of reacting to ethnic and cultural diversity (i.e., different mean scores on the measures of citizenship representations and of multiculturalism and exclusion attitudes), the patterns of the relationships between variables were highly similar.

The relations of the cultural citizenship-representation scale with the other variables were not in line with the theoretical conceptualization of cultural citizenship in the literature. As we had predicted, the cultural scale related positively to the ethnic and negatively to the civic representation scale, instead of vice versa. Moreover, in opposition to Kymlicka's (2001) claim, but in line with our predictions, the cultural scale was associated with negative attitudes towards immigrants. Although the cultural and ethnic citizenship representations are qualitatively different concepts, as our results suggest, their scales related to the other variables in much the same way. However, when all three citizenship-representation scales were analyzed simultaneously, the ethnic scale played no significant role in explaining attitudes towards immigrants, despite significant and relatively strong latent

interfactor correlations with the two attitude measures. This suggests that the ethnic representation scale mainly relates to attitudes towards immigrants, because of its relations with the cultural and civic scales. It also suggests that the shift from blatant to more symbolic forms of racism, which has taken place since World War II (Dovidio, 2000; Kleinpenning & Hagendoorn, 1993; Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995), may indeed have affected the way in which citizenship is represented. Besides the fact that the relations of the ethnic scale with the attitude measures could be set equal to zero, the mean scores on our ethnic scale indicated that, on average, participants did not endorse ethnic criteria of citizenship (see Table 3). This suggests that an ethnic citizenship representation, which is in line with older blatant forms of racism, is not relevant anymore. Instead, a cultural representation, which is in line with symbolic forms of contemporary racism, is now more prominent and influential (as indicated by mean scores which showed that, on average, participants in all countries attached importance to cultural criteria of citizenship and by more robust relations of the cultural representation scale with anti-immigrant attitudes). In sum, our findings support the idea that, nowadays, an ethnic citizenship representation is less relevant in explaining attitudes towards immigrants than cultural and civic representations.

Our study could be criticized for using only high school students and no adults as participants. However, adolescence is often considered to represent a critical age period for the development of attitudinal dispositions (Sears, 1990). Previous studies have shown that 17–18-year-olds already develop attitudes regarding social and political issues (e.g., Amadeo, Torney-Purta, Lehmann, Husfeldt, & Nikolova, 2002). Furthermore, a study in the Netherlands revealed that adolescent and adult samples did not differ with respect to migration-related attitudes (Hofstra, Van Oudenhoven, & Van der Zee, 2009). Still, we should be cautious with generalizing the results from our high school samples to national populations at large. A study in Australia, for example, showed that an ethnic citizenship representation tends to be more strongly endorsed by older participants than by younger ones (Pakulski & Tranter, 2000). On the one hand, this suggests that, among older participants, the ethnic citizenship representation could still play a significant role in explaining attitudes towards immigrants. On the other hand, if older people also shifted their focus away from ethnic citizenship and towards cultural citizenship, then it is possible that the pattern of results in our study would be even more pronounced among older participants (i.e., the cultural citizenship representation would play an even more prominent role among older adults than among our high school participants). Further research with representative national samples is required to examine these possibilities.

A more important limitation of our study is that its cross-sectional design prevents us from making inferences about causality. Although we used citizenship-representation scales as predictors in our structural equation model, it is also possible that different views on multiculturalism and on the exclusion of immigrants lead to the adoption of different citizenship representations. Given that evidence for both directions of effects has been found in previous studies (Meeus et al., 2010), it seems safe to assume that the representation of citizenship and attitudes towards immigrants mutually reinforce each other over time.

Future research might want to focus on where citizenship representations come from (e.g., what social, psychological, and contextual factors influence the development of someone's citizenship representation?). It remains relatively unclear why someone adopts one representation rather than another, and this issue definitely deserves more research attention. It is also important to investigate what (if anything) can be done to alter people's citizenship representations when these are counter-productive for harmonious intergroup relations in society (e.g., when they are associated with negative outgroup attitudes). Studies on the intergroup contact hypothesis (Allport, 1954) yielded promising results for reducing negative outgroup attitudes (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2008), and future studies might want to investigate whether the effects of intergroup contact extend to citizenship representations (e.g., do citizenship representations become more civic as a result of intergroup contact?).

Another important research question is whether measures of citizenship representations moderate or mediate the relation between strength of national identification and attitudes towards immigrants. According to SIT (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) and SCT (Turner et al., 1987), the way a group identity is represented is an important determinant of the relation between ingroup identification and outgroup attitudes. This is because such a representation includes norms for appropriate intergroup behavior, and those who identify more strongly with the group will be more inclined to think and act in accordance with those norms. Because citizenship representations can be regarded as an important part of national identity (Brubaker, 1996; Shulman, 2002), they may play a role in the relation between strength of national identification and attitudes towards immigrants. For example, Pehrson, Brown et al. (2009) found a moderation effect for a measure of an ethnic representation. Stronger national identification was related to more negative attitudes towards asylum seekers, but only for participants who endorsed an ethnic citizenship representation. In contrast, Meeus et al. (2010) found a mediation effect. Stronger Flemish identification resulted in a more ethnic citizenship representation, which in turn resulted in increased ethnic prejudice. Given these mixed findings, the moderation versus mediation question requires more research attention. Our partially metrically invariant measures of citizenship representations enable comparisons of relations between latent variables across countries (Meuleman & Billiet, 2006). In addition, they allow the researcher to determine whether different results across countries are caused by genuine country differences or by measurement differences. Therefore, our measures of citizenship representations could be a valuable contribution to further investigations.

Finally, if our findings regarding the cultural citizenship representation can be generalized to national populations, they may have important social and political ramifications. On the one hand, political parties on the extreme right may be changing their discourse from ethnic to cultural, because the public expression of blatant ethnic views is no longer considered socially acceptable. For example, the Sweden Democrats party, which has roots in several neo-Nazi movements, has gradually gotten rid of its more radical elements and has attempted to become more and more respectable over the years. They now propose to invest in “strengthening the Swedish culture” and propagate a policy of assimilation (*Immigration Policy Program Sweden Democrats*, 2007), which are clear expressions of a cultural citizenship representation. Other extreme right-wing parties, like Front National in France and Vlaams Belang in Belgium, have undergone similar transformations. On the other hand, more moderate political parties may be changing their discourse from civic and multi-cultural to cultural, because they do not want to be blamed for ignoring public concerns about immigration. Some of them are now prepared to ask immigrants to adapt to the dominant national culture. Political parties from different parts of the political spectrum seem to be “meeting in the middle,” as it were. However, this “middle” appears to be much more to the right than may be commonly assumed. While cultural citizenship has been portrayed as fair, liberal, and open towards immigrants by both political scientists and politicians, for our high school participants from six different EU countries, a measure of a cultural citizenship representation actually had the same negative relations with attitudes towards immigrants as a measure of an ethnic representation, but more robust! Based on our results with high school students, it seems that framing the public debate on immigrants and citizenship in cultural terms may not be a favorable development for intergroup relations and social cohesion in EU societies.

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Appendix

Citizenship Representation Items with the Belgian Context as Example

Ethnic Representation

To what extent do you consider the following personal characteristics and points of view to be important in order to regard someone as a Belgian person? To what extent do you consider it important that . . .

- 1) that person has Belgian ancestors?
- 2) that person was born in Belgium?
- 3) that person grew up in a Belgian family from an early age?

Cultural Representation

To what extent do you consider the following personal characteristics and points of view to be important in order to regard someone as a Belgian person? To what extent do you consider it important that . . .

- 1) that person cherishes the traditional Belgian lifestyle?
- 2) that person respects the Christian origin of Belgian culture?
- 3) that person has respect for Belgian symbols (e.g. the Belgian flag, the national anthem, etc)?

To what extent do you consider it important that a Belgian person takes the following points of view or undertakes the following actions? To what extent do you consider it important that a Belgian person . . .

- 4) helps to protect the Belgian culture against too rapid changes?
- 5) passes on the Belgian culture to the next generations?
- 6) dedicates him/herself to further developing the Belgian culture and to preserve it?

Civic Representation

To what extent do you consider it important that a Belgian person takes the following points of view or undertakes the following actions? To what extent do you consider it important that a Belgian person . . .

- 1) agrees that “being Belgian” has nothing to do with origin or cultural background, but only with the extent to which someone actively participates in Belgian society?
- 2) accepts that members of all cultural groups may participate in the political process, where societal rules are developed?
- 3) agrees that someone who legally settles in Belgium and who follows all basic rules, must receive the same rights as a Belgian citizen?
- 4) agrees that origin or cultural background *cannot* be reasons to deny someone Belgian citizenship?
- 5) For me Belgian citizenship is something that is attainable to anyone who legally settles in Belgium, who adheres to the legal rules and actively participates in society.

Discarded Items

To what extent do you consider the following personal characteristics and points of view to be important in order to regard someone as a Belgian person? To what extent do you consider it important that . . .

- 1) that person, irrespective of his/her mother tongue, commands the Dutch language well enough to easily communicate with others?
- 2) For me Belgian citizenship is something that only belongs to those who are really Belgian by origin. You have to be born with it and no one can ever take it away from you.